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In one respect, the results of the December 2011 elections were not a huge surprise for 
Russia-watchers. Polls, the results of the March regional elections, various experts and even 
Vladislav Surkov’s announcements had prepared the ground for United Russia to lose its 2/3 
majority in the Duma and retain just a simple majority. What was a shock for almost 
everyone was that the party got less than 50% of the votes cast. This was a huge 
psychological blow for the regime that continues to have repercussions. In certain respects, 
nothing has changed: The Kremlin still has a loyal and disciplined majority in the Duma and 
will be able to get its legislation adopted with few questions asked. And Russia is still, 
twenty years after the end of USSR, not close to experiencing a change of regime via the 
ballot box, as Vladimir Putin is still Russia’s most popular politician. Yet, for a regime that is 
used to dominating the formal political system via it’s ‘party of power’s overwhelming 
control of the national as well as regional legislatures, and demonstrating its invincibility in 
successive elections, less than 50% of votes is not an auspicious position, and is one that 
some commentators are already seeing as the beginning of the end of the Putin period, if 




In this paper, the aim is to explore why United Russia did not manage to obtain 50% of the 
votes and what this signifies about the current regime. It is argued that United Russia is a 
personalised party, dependent above all on the personal popularity and resources of 
Vladimir Putin and, to a lesser extent, on the personal resources of regional notables 
(governors, mayors etc). Therefore the party’s performance in elections can be interpreted 
as an indicator of the incumbent regime’s integrity, legitimacy and capacity to manage 
electoral outcomes. Principally what went wrong for the regime in 2011 was that the core 
pillars upon which United Russia’s electoral performance rested – the popularity and 
personal power of Vladimir Putin; the effectiveness of ‘governor-locomotives’; and 
administrative resources - were all less effective in 2011 than 2007, resulting in the 
lacklustre result for United Russia, puncturing the ‘aura of invincibility’
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 around the regime.  
 
What are elections for? 
Elections do matter in Russia, but not necessarily for the same reasons as in consolidated 
democracies: they do not act a mechanism for a democratic transfer of power, nor (or at 
least only in a very limited sense) do they serve as a mechanism for popular accountability 
of those in power. Instead, elections are better understood as an indicator of incumbent 
strength and integrity; of the incumbent’s ability to control the electoral sphere.
4
 Secondly, 
elections can be understood as a signal of popular acquiescence (which during the Putin 
period was perhaps akin to the ‘Brezhnev social contract’) which crucially conferred 
democratic legitimacy on the regime and the legitimacy of the Russian state is formally 
based on the idea of democratic origin. In this light, the December 2011 elections (and 
indeed the March 2011 regional elections which presaged them) indicate tectonic shifts in 
Russian politics as United Russia lost its constitutional majority and symbolically failed to 





What is United Russia (for)? 
United Russia is the most successful ‘party of power’ in Russia’s history. Unlike in the 1990s, 
when parties of power did not survive an election cycle, United Russia has won 3 national 
legislative elections and nearly all regional elections since 2003. However this is not a party 
in the classic sense: it does not perform a role in aggregating or articulating societal 
interests; it does not have a discernible role in influencing policy (or seeking to do so as a 
party); it does not have an identifiable ideology.
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 Elsewhere we have adapted the concept of 
the dominant party in authoritarian regimes, arguing that United Russia’s personalised 
nature and lack of agency distinguishes it from typical dominant parties like the People’s 
Action Party in Singapore so it is not able to play the typical roles expected of such parties.
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For Magaloni and Kricheli, dominant parties perform two main functions in non-democratic 
regimes ‘a bargaining function, whereby the dictator uses the party to bargain with elites 
and minimise potential threats to their stability; and a mobilising function, whereby 
dictators use the party machine to mobilise mass support’.
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 Both functions are important 
for maintaining regime cohesion and deterring would-be challengers. However, we argue 
that while United Russia assisted with the managing of elites via the party’s domination of 
legislatures, its influence on executives (regional and national) remained minimal and at 
regional level the party was less successful at managing elite conflict. Likewise, while the 
party assisted in propagating the notion of Putin as the ‘national leader’, the role of the 
party in mobilising the masses and managing elections was at best a subaltern one.
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 This is 
because of United Russia’s dependence upon, above all, the personal popularity of the 
president or national leader as well as other notables at regional level for their electoral 
support. In other words, it is not so much that the party mobilises support for the leader, 
but the other way around: the party harvests the national leader’s popularity at 
parliamentary and regional elections, underpinned by those of regional leaders, electoral 
clientelism, a skewed playing field (in terms of laws (and their selective application) on the 
registration of political parties and on elections),
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 administrative resources, media control 
and, to some extent, fraud. However, if one or more of these buttresses of party support 
are undermined, in particular the most important, personalistic, elements, then the party 
can struggle to maintain its seemingly invincible position in the political system, and this is 
what occurred during 2011.   
 
The 2011 Duma Elections 
Duma elections, coming just 4 months prior to presidential elections, have the sense of a 
presidential primary, with the vote for United Russia being an indicator of regime strength 
prior to the presidential elections, delivering popular legitimacy boost to the regime and the 
necessary support in the Duma to ensure a stable and favourable political climate for the 
subsequent all-important election. This was especially significant in the 2007-08 presidential 
succession, where a 2/3 Duma majority for United Russia was needed to guarantee Putin’s 
unassailable position as Prime Minister and to amend the constitution to extend the 
presidential term to 6 years.  
 
United Russia’s performance in Duma Elections 
 2003 2007 2011 
% vote 37.56* 64.3 49.32 
No. (%) Duma seats 315 (70%) 385 (85.5%) 238 (52.3%) 





In 2003 and especially 2007 there were several pillars to United Russia’s electoral success 
which faltered in 2011. The most important was the popularity and personal power of 
Vladimir Putin and the ability of the party to forge a close association with him personally in 
what remains a very personalised political system at national and regional levels. Indirectly 
in 2003 and very directly in 2007, Putin played the role of a ‘locomotive’ dragging the party 
to victory (but never intending to take up his Duma seat). In 2007 United Russia’s poll rating 
remained around 50%, which was insufficient to guarantee the smooth succession, and so 
rather unexpectedly, Putin headed the party list, and ratings immediately improved.
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 In 
2011, the situation was more complicated as both the party and Putin’s personal rating 
were falling, so Putin’s ability to act as a locomotive was reduced (see below).  
 
Personal Approval Ratings 
 2010 Jan-Jul 2011 Aug-Nov 2011 Net change 
Vladimir Putin 78-80% 69-68% 67-68% -10-15% 




Furthermore, after the party’s poor showing in the March 2011 regional elections, where 
United Russia’s vote share fell ~15-20%, Putin began actively to distance himself from the 
party and authorised Vycheslav Volodin to form the All-Russian People’s Front (ONF) in an 
attempt to rebrand the party, to draw fresh blood into it and, if necessary, provide an 
alternate basis for his presidential nomination. Putin has always had a rather ambivalent 
attitude to the party, which he led from 2008 until April 2012, but never actually became a 
formal member. In 2011, he chose not to head the party list, fearful it could harm his 
presidential bid, and handed to ‘locomotive’ role to Dmitri Medvedev. Even though analysts 
say Putin campaigned harder than ever for the party,
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 his refusal to head the list and the 
fact that they had no advance warning about his planned return to the presidency insulted 
the party, and threw them into disarray for several weeks at the beginning of the campaign. 
The ‘castling’ of Putin and Medvedev did not impress (urban, educated, middle class) voters 
either and evoked a surge of internet discourse about stagnation.
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 Furthermore, Medvedev 
was a poor fit with the party’s voters – not only had he declined to join the party, but he’d 
often been critical of it as he sought to cultivate a younger, more liberal image.   
 
 ‘Governor-locomotives’ were traditionally the second pillar of United Russia’s electoral 
success. During the 1990s, many governors were able to build electoral machines which 
enabled them to mobilise and direct voters
13
 and during the 2000s, the Kremlin sought to 
harness these machines to serve United Russia. So governors were recruited to head 
regional party lists and corralled into the party: in 2003 28 governors acted as ‘locomotives’, 
and by 2007 the number rose to 65. This strategy forced governors to take personal 
responsibility for the electoral performance of the party in their region and helped orientate 
regional and federal resources to a unified goal.  However, in 2011 this tactic was not so 
effective. Why? The end of governors’ direct election (in 2004) and the widespread 
replacement of governors 2009-11 was intended to strengthen the ‘power vertical’ by 
making governors’ entirely dependent upon the president. However it had the unintended 
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consequence of reducing many governors capacity to act as locomotives: some governors 
lacked popularity in their regions, or perhaps more importantly, had not yet established 
good relations with local elites.
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 Instead, in regions like Stavropol’, Leningrad and 
Volgograd the role of locomotive was passed to national figures like deputy Prime Ministers 
or celebrities like Valentina Tereshkova. Soon after the disappointing results, Medvedev 
announced plans to reintroduce directly elected governors, which inter alia can be 
interpreted as affirming the significance of governor’s personal popularity and resources in 
ensuring high turnout and pro-regime voting. 
 
The third pillar of United Russia’s success can be summarised under the umbrella term 
administrative resources. It is widely documented that the party was the beneficiary of the 
connections and resources that could be accessed by state officials who were party 
members or at least needed to demonstrate their loyalty to the Kremlin to ensure the 
appropriate flow of budget receipts. In a state as large and diverse as Russia there are a 
number of dimensions to this, but certain trends can be identified. There were attempts to 
mobilise voters through distributing resources in the name of United Russia. At national 
level this included electoral populism such a Prime Minister Putin’s 2011 cancellation of 
annual vehicle roadworthiness tests and a domestic energy price freeze.
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 At the regional 
level this meant local direct clientelism e.g. distributing food hampers to veterans.  We 
should also differentiate by region. In well-established authoritarian sub-regimes like 
Chechnya, Dagestan and Karbardino-Balkaria the election results directly reflected the 
extent of local elites’ control over the political sphere. Other regions required more subtle 
‘political technologies’ such as promises of long awaited infrastructure projects like roads or 
funding for pensioners’ organisations.
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 So direct and indirect means were used to enforce 
the connection in voters’ minds between more resources for them personally or for their 
locality if they voted for United Russia. Clearly such resources were effective in mobilising 
voters especially in rural areas and ethnic republics but by 2011 advancing communication 
technologies meant that voters’ were much more aware of such tactics, that in fact it was 
not a product of United Russia’s efforts and resources, and that it was illegal.
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 Therefore 
such tactics became less effective among urban populations, and particularly among 
younger and better educated voters. 
 
So the three pillars of support on which United Russia’s vote rested – Vladimir Putin’s 
popularity and personal power; governor-locomotives and administrative resources were all 
less effective in 2011 than in 2007 and this created some space for the opposition 
(parliamentary and non-parliamentary) to become more visible. While United Russia 
struggled to come up with a narrative: stability just was not as convincing in 2011 as it had 
been in 2003 when most of the electorate remembered the 1990s or in the context of the 
Chechen war; and coinciding with Putin’s anticipated return, sounded too much like 
stagnation. Bloggers like Aleksey Navalnyi’s branding of United Russia as ‘the party of 
swindlers and thieves’ reached an impressive 46% of voters
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 and despite the uneven 
playing field and marginalisation of opposition political parties, the ‘vote for anyone but 
United Russia’ campaign also seems to have had some effect in terms of getting voters to 






Contours and Significance of 2011 Election Results 
 
United Russia’s result below 50% (49.32%) was a significant blow to the regime. 
Authoritarian regimes need high voter turnout and high levels of support for the regime 
(over 2/3 preferably) even in the absence of competitive elections with real alternatives. 
This is because supermajorities based on very high turnouts help to create what Magaloni 
and Kricheli call an ‘aura of invincibility’ around the ruling regime. This image of invincibility 
helps to deter potential challengers, and especially defectors from the regime.
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 In this way, 
legislative elections perform what Golosov calls a ‘signalling’ function – transmitting the 
message that the regime is ‘rock solid’.
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 What happened on December 4
th
 then sent 
another signal – that the regime was losing its popular support and ability to control the 
outcome of elections. 
 
The regional breakdown of the voting for United Russia reveals a very stark differentiation in 
the levels of support in the ethnic Russian oblasts (where support was around 32-45% vote) 
and in non-Russian ethnic republics (e.g. results in 70s in Chukota, Bashkortorstan, Tatarstan 
and in the 80s in Karbardino-Balkari, Tuva and Karachai-Cherkessia and in the 90s in 
Chechnya, Dagestan and Mordovia).
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 These patterns continue those established in previous 
elections, but are more pronounced because of the significant drop in the vote for United 
Russia in the ethnically Russian regions. Further breakdowns point to the continued 
distinction between urban and rural voting, with rural voting being much more controlled 
and subject to administrative resources. Large cities consistently reported significant falls in 
the vote for United Russia.
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 All this suggests that, even if we put aside the widespread 
allegations of fraud, and indeed the spectacular public reaction to them, United Russia’s 
support was pushed back into the provinces and non-Russian regions, further limiting its 
ability to perform important stabilising functions for the regime such as integrating elites 
and co-opting potential challengers.  
 
In lieu of a conclusion 
 
The aura of invincibility essential to the long-term stability of Putin’s regime was irrevocably 
punctured by the 2011 Duma election results. United Russia receiving less than half the 
votes cast meant quite simply that the Kremlin was losing its ability to control elites 
sufficiently to ensure adequate pro-regime voting. This revealed the known weaknesses of 
the ‘power vertical’ all too clearly and in turn raised further questions about the 
effectiveness of Putin’s rule. The subsequent ‘authoritarian reaction’ in the form of laws 
further restricting the activity of NGOs, demonstrations, extending the legal definition of 
treason, creating a legal pretext for internet censorship, the prosecution of a number of 
opposition activists, the unseating of critical deputies and senators, and the removal of 
governors in regions where United Russia fared poorly all serve to underline the extent to 
which the regime was frightened by the December 2011 events and the large-scale mass 
protests that followed. The crackdown was intended to raise the costs of defecting from the 
regime for elites and of supporting the opposition for the masses. It also represented an 
attempt to claw back a sense in the minds of elites and the population that the regime was 




While such measures may work to some extent in the short-term – for example the 
December 2012 protests were very small compared to those one year previously – it is 
unlikely to do so in the longer term as a sense that ‘There Is No Alternative’ is not the same 
as democratic legitimacy to rule, which was undermined not only by the election result for 
United Russia and also by the waves of popular protest contesting the legitimacy of the 
result, and the three main supports for United Russia’s electoral performance outlined 
above are also key props for the regime itself. Putin’s rating will never recover its earlier 
dizzy heights and the unassailable position it conveyed. The ‘power vertical’ is not an 
effective form of governance
23
 and the capacity of ‘political technologies’ to manufacture 
convincing electoral support is waning. Moreover United Russia’s political capital (always a 
function of Putin’s) is increasingly viewed as a political liability by elites at all levels of the 
political system,
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 making the future of the party uncertain. However, the party does 
perform important functions for the regime, albeit not exactly effectively, and the next 
parliamentary elections are a still long time away. After all, as Putin said in 2007, ‘[United 
Russia] lacks a stable ideology or principles … [and attracts] all sorts of freeloaders … 
nevertheless we have nothing better…’
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 In sum, the regime was profoundly shaken by the 
2011 Duma election results as some of its weaknesses were revealed both to elites and to 
the masses. The role of United Russia as the principle formal mechanism for integrating and 
co-opting elites and for harvesting Putin’s popularity at election time is consequently being 
reviewed – as indicated by the relaxation of the party registration rules and particularly 
discussions about a reversion to a mixed electoral system – but it may not be substantively 
changed. It is likely that the Kremlin will prefer an increasingly ineffective personalised 
dominant party to starting from scratch without a clear idea or consensus on what might 
constitute a viable alternative.  
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